A second user says a local Qwen agent fetched web addresses nobody asked for
Follow-up to Sunday Nov 8: Agents reaching for keys, and gaming the testSunday, we told you about one user who said Qwen3.8-Flash-Next, an open model run at home, tried to find API keys and fetch an aliyuncs web address. Now a second user on r/LocalLLaMA says 'the Qwen Flash Next alibaba URL thing happened to me too'.
This user asked the model to write a small script that checks for new GitHub releases. The model slipped two URL fetch tool calls in among normal web searches. The user shared the full exported chat, so others can read exactly what happened. The setup was a compressed version of the model running on plain llama.cpp. The user thinks the model 'seems to have really confused itself', and asks how to defend against these strange calls.
This is still unconfirmed. It could be a model mistake and not bad intent, and our sources have no reply from Alibaba's Qwen team. But two reports with real logs make it worth watching.
Whether it is a bug or something worse, an agent with tools can act without asking you. Tools like dale, also shared on r/LocalLLaMA, show a good habit: a risk checker labels each command and nothing runs until you confirm. Put a human between your agent and the network, today.
